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CONTROL OF SPACE SHUTTLE MAINTENANCE COST BY THE APPLICATION OF AIRLINE METHODS
R. S. Williams
Manager, Engineering
Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Jamaica, New York
ABSTRACT

Fault Detection and Isolation

This paper attempts to relate certain areas of
similarity between Space Shuttle operation and
Airline operation. The design controlled
factors affecting airline maintenance cost are
discussed. The thesis is that the Space Shuttle
designer should consider airline experience in
areas affecting maintenance cost in order to
design the most cost effective Space Shuttle
System.

The Space Shuttle will be far too complex to be
designed for zero failure. Once we accept this
we then must design to allow for mechanical
failures and system deterioration. Systems must
be designed so that failures can be detected and
isolated in a minimum of time. In fact we must
go further than just the detection of failures.
We must be able to detect deterioration and pre
dict failures. This will allow insipient pro
blems to be corrected by preventive maintenance
before an actual failure occurs.

INTRODUCTION

The primary goal of the Space Shuttle is the
ability to put men and material into an earth
orbit and return them to earth with safety,
schedule reliability and at low cost. There
is no doubt that NASA working with the aero
space industry can accomplish the first two,
that is to operate with safety and schedule
reliability. It is the third to operate "At
Low Cost" which will present the greatest
challenge.
There are many similarities between Space Shuttle
and Airline Operation. For that reason, a look
at the airline approach to control of recurring
costs should be of value to the Space Shuttle
designer. Maintenance cost for Pan Am for
various aircraft varies between 21% and 33% of
overall operating cost and it is not unreason
able to assume that this percentage will be
higher on the Space Shuttle because it is the
first reuseable space system to be built.
Control of Maintenance cost, therefore, can have
considerable impact on Space Shuttle recurring
costs.
Airline experience indicates four major areas
which must be considered during preliminary de
sign if maintenance cost is to be controlled.
They are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The airlines have concentrated on self-contained
fault isolation equipment. The basic specifi
cation on the B747 was written to include on
board fault isolation in all flight critical
systems. This is particularly adaptable to
electronic systems and most LRU's include fault
indicator lights and fault isolation logic built
directly into the component. Where there are
several closely interrelated components in a
system which makes fault isolation difficult,
the approach is to check complete system opera
tion with on-board check-out equipment. An
example is the aircraft system for determining
gross weight and center of gravity location. On
command the computer in this system injects a
signal which checks all of the components, wiring
and connectors and isolates the fault to zones
allowing quick component change to correct the
problem. The pay off has been in fewer uncon
firmed removals and shorter maintenance down
time.
Based on airline experience, when self-contained
fault isolation is not installed:
1.
2.
3.

Fault detection and isolation
Redundancy
Maintainability
A comprehensive maintenance program

More complex G.S.E. and software are required
for fault isolation.
Troubleshooting time is extended with re
sultant delays in vehicle release from
maintenance.
Fault isolation is less accurate where
intermittent faults are involved.

All of these increase maintenance cost without
a corresponding increase in reliability.
The Space Shuttle must have as a design goal
inclusion of on-board self-test equipment in all
systems and components if maintenance cost and
down time are to be minimized.
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Redundancy

Maintainability

With today's "state of the art" it is not
possible to detect and correct each incident of
deterioration before a system or component
failure results. Therefore, in order to insure
mission reliability, redundancy as well as re
liability must be designed into the system. The
depth and type of redundancy required depends on
system criticality. But in all cases redundancy
must be carefully weighed against increased re
liability requirements because maintenance costs
rise sharply as reliability requirements in
crease. This is brought about by:

Maintainability in most cases is the judicious
application of engineering know how, experience
and common sense. Basically this means to design
for simplicity, accessibility, quick replacement
and rapid system revalidation after a fault has
been corrected. If maintainability is not con
sidered in preliminary design, an aircraft or the
Space Shuttle, for that matter, cannot be main
tained at low cost. Retrofit to obtain main
tainability is extremely costly. In all aircraft
acquisitions, and this includes the Shuttle
vehicles, the customer must be deeply involved in
the preliminary design process to determine that
maintainability is not lost in the trade off f s
with weight, cost and production convenience.
Because it is the customer who must pay for
maintenance.

1.
2.
3.
4.

More rigid control of shop limits
More exhaustive testing requirements
Higher level of technician capability and
training
More sophisticated shop equipment and clean
liness

A look at the procurement of the B747 from Boeing
will illustrate how an airline injects its re
quirements into the design to obtain maintain
ability. After a feasibility study and high level
agreement that Pan Am was interested in such an
aircraft, Boeing submitted the B747 Basic Speci
fication for review. It was at this point that
Engineering and Maintenance made a concentrated
input to insure maintainability. The changes to
the Basic Specification requested by Pan Am read
like a textbook in maintainability. These
changes were based on Engineering analysis and
application of experience with earlier aircraft.
A review of that document would be of interest to
all who are involved in the Space Shuttle pro
curement process.

System reliability through redundancy with a
lower order of reliability can result in a lower
acquisition and maintenance cost.
"Designed-In" redundancy allows airlines to
dispatch aircraft with systems or portions of
systems inoperative. This increases schedule
reliability and reduces maintenance cost by
allowing repairs to be delayed until a time when
parts and man power are available. It is
doubtful that this procedure will be applicable
to the Space Shuttle during the early stages of
operation. As operating experience and con
fidence increase, it may well be the most cost
effective approach.
In airline parlance, redundancy does not
necessarily mean that two, three or four identi
cal systems are installed with all except one on
standby ready to take over if a failure should
occur. This type of redundancy is used in
flight critical systems such as the autopilot,
autoland and inertial navigation systems but for
less critical system redundancy may take one of
several forms:

After contract signing the "Detail Specification"
became the controlling document for the aircraft.
This specification is still maintained although
it has been revised 32 times since the original
issue. It now reflects our requirements for a
second group of B747's which are being delivered
later this year. The Basic Specification never
remains firm for long. It is continually in a
state of change. These changes fall into two
categories:

1.

In modern aircraft structure due to multiple
load paths there is no single point failure
which will be catastrophic. For example,
if the lower cord of a wing spar fails
flight loads will be carried by stringers
and wing skin. This reduces the margin of
safety but still allows safe flight.

1.

Those changes initiated by the manufacturer
as a product improvement. Some of these are
incorporated at no cost to the customer but
others may involve increased cost or penal
ties in performance or weight.

2.

2.

In instrumentation pressure indicators are
backed up with pressure warning lights so
that if either is inoperative mission re
liability is not effected.

Those changes requested by the customer.
They usually reflect service experience on
the aircraft in operation or are the result
of research and development by the airline
or component manufacturers.

3.

In engine instrumentation several parameters
are monitored, due to the interrelation of
these parameters, one or more may be inoper
ative without jeopardizing engine operation.

In all changes, maintainability is given con
sideration.
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Pan Am invested
Maintenance man
development and
but still there
maintainability
help to clarify
1.

2.

over 100 Engineering and
years during the four year
procurement process of the B747
were many details which escaped
scrutiny. Some examples will
this point:

In the development of a maintenance program there
are certain concepts which should be understood.

When the JT9D engine was designed for the
B747, 21 horoscope holes were installed.
These holes allow inspection of the sus
pected trouble areas inside the engine.
When Boeing installed the auxiliary equip
ment on the engine such as plumbing, ducts,
pumps, etc., 14 of the 21 holes were ob
structed. We now must remove equipment to
gain access to these 14 inspection holes.
If maintainability had been given proper
consideration this would not have occurred.
The B747 is equipped with upper and lower
rudders for redundancy. At higher speeds
less rudder travel is required. To accom
plish this a Rudder Ratio Changer has been
installed to vary the amount of rudder de
flection as an inverse function of airspeed.
This system contains two control units, two
actuators and one comparator. The actuator
motor is designed to operate from the fully
extended position of 141 knots to the fully
retracted position at 359 knots and the
motor is stalled, at the end of actuator
travel, at all other times. On the ground,
with inadequate cooling, heat build up from
the stalled mo'tor overheats the lubricant
in the motor bearings and the motor fails.
Add to this the requirement for a 40 foot
work stand to change the actuator and you
have a perfect example of maintainability
not being considered in design.

Safety is not a negotiable item. There are
minimum safety standards established by the
airline and by federal regulations which
must be complied with. Safety is of prime
importance in any acceptable maintenance
program.

2.

Maintenance which is not required not only
imposes an economic penalty but degrades
reliability. A few years ago when major
overhauls were accomplished on aircraft, the
trouble rate was invariably highest during
the first 200 to 300 flight hours after re
lease from overhaul. This resulted from in
fant mortality of overhauled units installed
as well as from problems introduced by in
attention to details or slips in quality
control.

3.

The maintenance program
of the aircraft to that
developed and confirmed
reaches the operational

and the compatibility
program must be
before the aircraft
stage.

A look at the B747 Maintenance Program and its
development should be of value during the pro
curement phase of the Space Shuttle. Working
with other airlines and with the FAA, a pre
liminary maintenance plan for the B747 has been
established. Structural inspection items are
all on a sampling basis. Feedback from inspection
findings to the system establishes the frequency
and number of future inspections. Component
removals are not specified by fixed time between
overhaul but rather a procedure has been estab
lished where system and components will be
monitored for condition and the feedback will
determine if a fixed time between removal is
required .

Maintenance Program
The last design consideration and for sure the
most misunderstood is the maintenance program.
Airlines have experienced a major evolution in
maintenance philosophy during the past decade.
One of the most important facets has been the
change from a fixed time between overhauls to
"on-condition" maintenance. "On-condition"
means that the inspection, check and replacement
of a component or system and the extent of re
furbishment and testing required is best deter
mined by the condition of that component or
system. System condition is determined by one
or more of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

1.

The removal of a component from the aircraft is
scheduled when deterioration occurs as evidenced
by monitoring or when a malfunction renders the
unit partially or totally inoperative. Once the
component is removed, the shop processing is of
importance to reliability as well as cost. With
rare exception, we no longer overhaul components.
By overhaul we mean to return the component to
original manufacturers specifications in all areas.
Rather than overhaul, we repair the trouble re
ported and refurbish those areas which are known
to be subject to wear or deterioration.
The work required on a component when it reaches
the shop is determined by the information obtained
from monitoring, from flight crew reports, from
the mechanic removing the component and by a preservice test of the component. The pre-service
test is made primarily to determine if the unit
has actually failed and if so, to define what is
required to restore the unit to an airworthy con
dition. The component is then repaired to the

Flight Crew Observations
On-Board Monitoring
Visual Checks
Ground Checks using Aircraft Instruments
Ground Checks using Ground Test Equipment
Non-Destructive Testing
Monitoring and Analysis of Performance Data
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extent necessary to correct the problem found,
tested, and put in stock for reinstallation.
During shop repair, service limits are used and
components are not normally returned to original
design specifications. The component is tested
only to the extent necessary to check the work
that was done and the affect that work would have
on the rest of the component. The rationale
behind this is as follows: Consider a complex
component with many parts - when a single part
fails, the component malfunctions. If the part
had not failed, the component would have con
tinued to function normally. Therefore, re
placement of the failed part and testing component
operation is all that is necessary to restore this
complete component to an airworthy condition.
Since the change from a "Fixed Time" to an
"on-condition" Maintenance Program on the 707 and
727 aircraft, Pan Am has experienced no increase
in flight crew reported items, there has been no
increase in the delay rate, and overall component
unscheduled removal rate has been reduced. In
addition to the reduction of the unscheduled com
ponent removals, all scheduled removals for com
ponents which are "on-condition" have been
eliminated. This has reduced maintenance cost
significantly. In 1969 approximately 18,000
component time limit removals were eliminated.
The reduced shop workload amounted to an esti
mated $2,200,000 for material and $3,800,000 for
labor. The reduced aircraft workload for removal
and installation of the components is estimated
at $575,000 for a total 1969 savings of over
$6,500,000. Although no dollar figure has been
assigned, it also resulted in reduced aircraft
down time.
The maintenance plan contains servicing items such
as lubrication, area inspection, fluid quantity
checks, tire pressure checks and so forth which
are specified at fixed times. But even these
times are negotiable and during the first year of
operation we have extended and reduced many of
these service periods to fit the needs of the
system.
We maintain aircraft by monitoring operation,
inspecting the airframe, engines and systems, and
by giving them all a good "letting alone". In
one sentence, that outlines the Modern Airline
Maintenance Philosophy and we predict that it
will some day be the basic maintenance plan of a
"Low Maintenance Cost" Space Shuttle.
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